Abstract. The AR hash function has been proposed by Algorithmic Research Ltd and is currently being used in practice in the German banking world. AR hash is based on DES and a variant of the CBC mode. It produces a 128 bit hash value. In this paper, we present t w o attacks on AR hash. The rst one constructs in one DES encryption two messages with the same hash value. The second one nds, given an arbitrary message M, a n M 0 6 = M with the same hash value as M. The attack is split into two parts, the rst part needs about 2 33 DES encryptions and succeeds with probability 63, the second part needs at most about 2 66 DES encryptions and succeeds with probability about 99 of the possible choices of keys in AR. Moreover, the 2 33 respectively 2 66 encryptions are necessary only in a one-time preprocessing phase, i.e. having done one of the attacks once with success, a new message can be attacked at the cost of no encryptions at all. Since the hash value is 128 bits long, the times for the attacks should be compared to 2 64 , resp. 2 128 DES encryptions for brute force attacks. For the particular keys chosen in AR hash we implemented the rst part of the second attack. In 2 33 encryptions we found two messages that breaks AR hash.
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The AR Hash Function
The AR hash function has been proposed by Algorithmic Research Ltd., it has been distributed in the ISO community 1 for informational purposes, but has not been considered a standard. It is currently in use in the German banking world.
In the following, DES k y will denote the DES-encryption of block y using key k.
The basic structure in AR-hash can be described as a variant of DES in CBC-mode, where the last 2 ciphertext blocks are added to the current input, and where the state consists of the last two "ciphertext" blocks computed. To do the entire function, the message is processed with two k eys, yielding a result of 2 times 128 bits. This is then further compressed to get a result of 128 bits.
To de ne AR more precisely, w e rst divide the message m to be hashed into 8-byte blocks, denoted by m 1 ; m 2 ; :::; m n 0-padding is used on the last block i f it is incomplete.
We Although none of these properties imply directly a collision for the hash function itself, they will be useful in the following.
3 Attacks on AR Hash
Collision attack
A collision attack nds two messages m and m 0 that hash to the same value. This rst attack on AR hash exploits the fact that for a weak key k it is easy to nd xpoints for DES, i.e. to nd m s.t. DES k m = m: There are exactly 2 32 such xpoints for a weak key 2 and each xpoint can be found in half a DES encryption. Since all round keys for a weak key are equal, a necessary and su cient condition for a xpoint is that the halves of the encrypted value after 8 rounds of encryption are equal.
If The above attack can be extended to attacks that in time n=2 encryptions nd n messages that hash to the same value, where n 2 32 . By contrast, a brute force attack that nds two messages that hash to the same value would require computation of about 2 64 hash values.
Preimage attack
A preimage attack takes a given message M as input and tries to nd a new message with the same hash value.
AR hash uses two xed keys. In the following we consider arbitrary keys, where one key, k 1 , i s a w eak key 1 .
The basic idea in this second attack on AR hash is to try to nd a message which takes the initial state back to itself, i.e. leads to a set of all-zero c-values. If Z is such a message, then clearly ARM = ARZjM = ARZjZjM = . I t is also clear that once we h a v e found such a Z , a n y message M can be attacked at no further cost. The DES has 4 weak keys.
It is di cult in general to say a n ything about the number of solutions to these equations, or how hard it is to nd them. There is a special case, however, that is easier: Let m 1 be a xpoint for k 1 . Put m 2 = DES k2 m 1 . Then 2 is always satis ed and 1 is true if DES k1 DES k2 m 1 = DES k2 m 1 3 which is true if also DES k2 m 1 is a xpoint for k 1 . It is reasonable to assume that the mapping DES k2 distributes xpoints for k 1 uniformly. Therefore the probability that DES k2 m 1 is a xpoint for k 1 is 2 ,32 . By running through all xpoints for k 1 the probability that 3 is satis ed is 1 , 1 , 2 ,32 2 32 ' 1 , e ,1 ' 0:63
Since checking whether a message is a xpoint for a weak key takes half a DES encryption, the attack needs a total of 22 32 = 2 33 DES encryptions. A similar attack appeared in 3 .
To con rm the validity of the 0.63 probability, w e did a computer simulation on a "scaled-down" version of DES, working with 32-bit blocks, thus making it easy to run through all xpoints. The experiments con rmed the theory. The test ran through all 2 16 xpoints for 100 pairs of keys, where one key was a weak key in a 32 bit block v ersion of DES. Out of 100 key pairs, the equation 3 had a solution for 62 pairs.
The above attack is quite feasible, and can be executed in at most a few days, even hours, using up to date hardware. Later in this section we give the results of an implementation of the attack on AR hash with the two k eys given in 1 .
The above probability can be improved to almost 1 on the cost of a squared complexity. In this case we proceed as follows where m 1 is not necessarily a xpoint for k 1 The remaining question is of course if there are any solutions to the equations at all. Simply doing the 2 66 encryptions is not feasible today although it probably will become feasible in the not too distant future. Therefore the best we can do is to see if we can estimate the probability that solutions exist, assuming that the two k eys k 1 ; k 2 are randomly chosen, but where k 1 is a weak key.
Each of the 4 equations can be written in the form hm 1 = 0, where h is some function that depends on the keys, and is built from a number of DES enand decryptions. It is a generally accepted assumption that DES in a context like this one behaves like a random function. This means that the 3 equations 4,5 and 7 each h a v e solutions with an independent probability o f 1 , 1 , 2 ,64 2 64 ' 1 , e ,1 ' 0:63
However since 6 contains 3 as a special case this probability splits into two depending on whether xpoints are examined or not, the probability that 6 has a solution therefore is The weaknesses we h a v e found in AR hash clearly make i t v ery problematic to continue using the hash function as it is. The collision and preimage attacks can be thwarted by adding the message length to the message, however because of Theorem 3 collisions still can be obtained in constant time, because Z 1 jM and Z 2 jM would hash to the same value.
So the question arises whether one can repair the function so that our attacks are prevented.
We h a v e of course exploited the fact, that there are 2 32 xpoints for a weak DES key and that they are easy to nd. However, avoiding weak keys still would enable a preimage attack, since equations 4, 5 and 6 can be set up independently of the nature of the keys. The probability for success for this attack is expected to be 1 , e ,3 ' 95.
To con rm this we did another computer simulation on a "scaled-down" version of DES. The test used 16 bit blocks and ran through all 2 16 possible messages for 100 pairs of random keys. Out of 100 key pairs, for only 3 key pairs none of the equations 4, 5 and 6 had solutions thus con rming the theory.
Furthermore we made essential use of the fact that the initial state is all-zero, in particular that it consists of 4 blocks that are equal. Trying to prevent attacks only by c hanging the initial values is extremely dangerous and it is shown in 3 how to nd collisions even in this case. Section 2 show s a n umber of problematic properties of f 1 , f 2 and G that are independent on the initial state and on the chosen keys, we therefore believe that the basic design of f 1 , f 2 and G should be reconsidered. One can perhaps guess that AR hash or rather the f 1 ; f 2 functions was designed starting from the standard MAC-mode for DES which uses a secret key, obtaining a hash function by using a known, xed key, and adding some extra elements the feedforward, etc. to compensate for the weaknesses implied by the fact that the key is now known.
Our attacks can be seen as an illustration that constructing a hash function in this way from a MAC is not easy, and that it is perhaps a better strategy to build a hash function mode "from scratch".
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